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ABSTRACT: Growing Sino-Russian coordination necessitates
greater security cooperation between US Allies in Europe and
East Asia. US Allies in both regions face remarkably similar
threats requiring similar operational concepts, capabilities, and
technologies. Further, these Allies must hedge against the specter
of US abandonment. An exploration of the links between the two
geographically distant US Alliance networks illustrates the Allies’
perspectives on US extended deterrence and highlights opportunities
to devise better policies for cooperation.

O

ver the last decade, strategic links between East Asia and
Europe have grown rapidly. Consequently, the analysis
and management of US Alliances require an interregional
perspective that explicitly assesses the connections between the security
and geopolitical dynamics in both regions. As they have in the past,
US Alliances must play a central role in today’s era of renewed greatpower competition.1 After all, one of the advantages the United States
enjoys vis-à-vis either China or Russia is its possession of a strongly
institutionalized alliance system. If the United States and its Allies remain
complacent, however, China and Russia could coordinate to divide US
attention and resources and drive wedges within and between existing
US Alliances.
Leveraging synergies between US Alliances in both regions would
benefit the United States in the context of its competition with Russia
and China. But this is not a debate confined to Washington. America’s
European and East Asian Allies must proactively engage in interregional
dialogues to remain cohesive in the face of greater Sino-Russian
coordination and to counter skepticism in the United States about the
value of Alliances.

The Stage
On July 23, 2019, Russia and China jointly flew warplanes near
island clusters called Dokdo in South Korea and Takeshima in Japan
respectively, driving a wedge between two US Allies that dispute the
1. Elbridge A. Colby and A. Wess Mitchell, “The Age of Great-Power Competition: How the
Trump Administration Refashioned American Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 1 (January/February
2020): 118–30.
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sovereignty over these islands.2 And security coordination between
Moscow and Beijing is not limited to East Asia: in July 2017, China’s
People’s Liberation Army Navy and the Russian Navy participated in a
joint exercise in the Baltic Sea.3 According to a Chinese military expert,
China and Russia “need to lean on each other for support to deal with
hostilities from different fronts.”4 In January 2019, then US Director of
National Intelligence Dan Coats told Congress, “China and Russia are
more aligned than at any point since the mid-1950s, and the relationship
is likely to strengthen in the coming year as some of their interests and
threat perceptions converge.”5
Moreover, the Biden-Harris administration’s references to a global
struggle between democracy and authoritarianism implicitly assume
an alignment between Russia and China and thus lower expectations
Washington will try to create fissures between the two nations.6 Indeed,
the Biden White House’s Interim National Security Strategic Guidance alludes
to the fact that Russia and China represent a threat to US Allies and
interests in the critical regions of Europe and the Indo-Pacific.7 The
prospect of deeper security coordination between those two powers
in Europe, the Indo-Pacific, and elsewhere threatens to complicate
America’s global strategic picture.
In contrast, US Allies in Europe and Asia continue to display
rather tenuous security ties, despite repeated promises of further
cooperation. For decades, these distant groupings of US Allies have
enjoyed a quasi-alliance with each other, a term used by some scholars
to designate the relationship between those states who share alliance
ties with a common third party but not with each other.8 Despite such
long-standing quasi-alliance ties, US Allies in Europe and East Asia
have had a limited security interaction with each other due to resource
scarcity, geographical distance, and the need to prioritize threats in
their respective regions.9 Yet US European and East Asian Allies now
2. Brad Lendon, “Why Russia and China Are Wading into a Centuries’ Old Dispute over a Tiny
Island Cluster,” CNN, updated July 27, 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/26/asia/south
-korea-russia-japan-china-warplanes-analysis-intl-hnk/index.html.
3. Richard Weitz, “Assessing the Sino-Russian Baltic Sea Drill,” China Brief 17, no. 12,
Jamestown Foundation, September 20, 2017, https://jamestown.org/program/assessing-the
-sino-russian-baltic-sea-drill/.
4. Ni Lexiong quoted in Tommy Yang, “Strategy Behind China Joining Russia ‘on NATO
Doorsteps’ in Baltic Sea,” Sputnik News, July 21, 2017, https://sputniknews.com/politics
/201707211055763714-china-drills-russia-baltic-sea/.
5. Daniel R. Coats, Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community (Washington, DC: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2019), 4,
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR---SSCI.pdf.
6. Joseph R. Biden Jr., “America’s Place in the World” (remarks, US Department of State
Headquarters, Washington, DC, February 4, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room
/speeches-remarks/2021/02/04/remarks-by-president-biden-on-americas-place-in-the-world/.
7. Joseph R. Biden Jr., Interim National Security Strategic Guidance (Washington, DC: White
House, March 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
8. Victor D. Cha, Alignment despite Antagonism: The US-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 1999).
9. Stephan Frühling, “ ‘Key to the Defense of the Free World’: The Past, Present and Future
Relevance of NATO for US Allies in the Asia-Pacific,” Journal of Transatlantic Studies 17, no. 2
(March 2019): 238–54.
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have good reasons to develop more robust security relationships with
each other. At least three sets of interrelated developments underscore
this point.
The first development, already mentioned, relates to improving
security cooperation between China and Russia.10 Greater coordination
in security policies can allow these two powers to maintain a cohesive
front, outflank the United States, and undermine the security of
America’s European and East Asian Allies. Notably, through arms
transfers and greater military coordination, Russia and China have
strengthened each other’s capabilities, while mutually learning from best
technological and operational practices.
Moreover, Russia and China appear to be engaging in coordinated
probing in Europe and East Asia, executing incremental, self-restrained
actions designed to test the reactions of the United States and its Allies
and better gauge the boundaries of their freedom of action while staying
below the threshold of traditional military activity.11 Coordinated
Sino-Russian actions against US interests and Allies in Europe and
East Asia could force Washington into a long and resource-draining
two-flank competition and compel it to make difficult choices. Such
coordinated activities could lead to tensions between the United States
and its Allies regarding which threats to prioritize, but could also lead to
tensions between US Allies in the two regions as they compete for US
resources and attention.
The second development pertains to the similarity of the regional
threats US Allies in Europe and East Asia face. Through their advances in
precision strike and missile modernization programs, Russia and China
seek to undermine the local military balance in northeastern Europe and
in the Western Pacific. Relatedly, as they strengthen their local military
positions relative to that of the United States and foster the perception
they may enjoy local military superiority in certain parts of Europe or
the Western Pacific, Moscow and Beijing can more confidently engage
in nontraditional forms of probing. Conceptually, US Allies in Europe
and East Asia face a similar problem, namely, how to counter the threat
posed by Russian and Chinese military modernization and hybrid or
gray-zone activities. To address such similar threats, US Allies must
draw on similar operational concepts, capabilities, and technologies,
which will reveal opportunities for collaboration.
The third development concerns persistent uncertainty about US
security commitments to either region. This problem became particularly
pressing in the face of US President Donald Trump’s “America First”
vision and mixed signals about the value of Alliances.12 Even under
the Biden-Harris administration, recovering the damaged trust in
10. Alexander Korolev, “How Closely Aligned Are China and Russia? Measuring Strategic
Cooperation in IR,” International Politics 57 (2020): 760–89.
11. Jakub J. Grygiel and A. Wess Mitchell, The Unquiet Frontier: Rising Rivals, Vulnerable Allies, and
the Crisis of American Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016).
12. Mira Rapp Hooper, “Saving America’s Alliances: The United States Still Needs the System
That Put It on Top,” Foreign Affairs 99, no. 2 (March/April 2020).
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US Alliances will require the efforts of all parties to those Alliances.
Although the Biden-Harris administration has put Alliances at the
center of its foreign policy, US Allies cannot rule out the possibility of a
less Alliance-friendly president in the future.
Concerns about US security commitments also include questions
about how the United States will prioritize between Europe and
East Asia at a time when America faces two great-power challengers
simultaneously, and when the power gap it enjoyed during the socalled unipolar era appears to be diminishing.13 The specter of US
retrenchment from their regions incentivizes Allies to hedge, either
by investing in strengthening their own autonomy or diversifying their
portfolio of security partnerships.14 Greater ties with each other can be
part of that package. To be sure, such ties cannot be seen as an adequate
alternative to their existing Alliances with the United States, because no
group of countries can match US power-projection capabilities. Rather,
these ties can strengthen the bargaining position of Allies in both
regions vis-à-vis the United States and can hedge against uncertainty
surrounding the future of US foreign policy.

Similarities

US Allies in Europe and East Asia are part of an extended deterrence
success story. Although adversaries have conducted large-scale military
attacks against countries with close security ties to the United States—
South Korea in 1950, Taiwan in 1954, and Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistani
Wars—there appears to be no such attack against a US Ally protected by
an applicable defense obligation of the United States.15
The two regions also present important similarities in terms of
their threat environments. One common feature relates to the threat
posed by theater-range missiles and the proliferation of anti-access/
area-denial capabilities. This concern becomes particularly pressing
following the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF)
Treaty: progress in fielding theater-range missiles and anti-access/
area-denial capabilities is enabling Russia and China to behave more
aggressively. In this context, US Allies in Europe and East Asia face
a similar conceptual problem—how to counter an impending missile
challenge through enhanced missile defense capabilities, which includes

13. Linde Desmaele and Luis Simón, “East Asia First, Europe Second: Picking Regions in
US Grand Strategy,” War on the Rocks, August 7, 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/08/east
-asia-first-europe-second-picking-regions-in-u-s-grand-strategy/.
14. Sven Biscop, “Letting Europe Go Its Own Way: The Case for Strategic Autonomy,” Foreign
Affairs, July 6, 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2018-07-06/letting-europe-go-its
-own-way; and Yogesh Joshi, India-Japan-Australia Minilateral: The Promise and Perils of Balancing
Locally, Observer Research Foundation (ORF) Occasional Paper 114 (New Dehli, India: ORF, May
2017), 1–22.
15. Tongfi Kim, “U.S. Trans-Pacific and Trans-Atlantic Alliances: A Comparison,” Georgetown
Journal of International Affairs, January 6, 2019, https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2019/01/06/trans
-pacific-and-trans-atlantic-alliances.
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weighing the pros and cons of deploying theater-range missiles to deter
Russian and Chinese aggression.16
And even if they may not go so far as launching a direct attack on
US Allies, Russia’s or China’s missile and military buildup could give
them the confidence to engage more aggressively in hybrid or gray-zone
forms of warfare.17 Precisely because US extended deterrence has been
so successful in preventing armed conflicts, China and Russia now
engage in hybrid or gray-zone tactics, which are aggressive but aimed to
avoid triggering military retaliation. Russia’s “Little Green Men” have
infiltrated Ukraine since 2014, while China’s “Little Blue Men” have
advanced Chinese interests in the South and East China Seas.18 As US
Alliances were originally designed with large-scale armed aggression in
mind, such hybrid or gray-zone tactics leave uncertainty about how these
Alliances can cope with them.19 The link between traditional military
threats and nontraditional ones is therefore concerning for US Allies in
both regions.
The challenges China and Russia pose to US Allies in East Asia and
Europe is further compounded by growing Sino-Russian cooperation.
Such cooperation has grown steadily in the post–Cold War era, and
the two former adversaries now appear to be aligned strategically.20 In
particular, periodic joint exercises, staff exchanges, and arms sales point
to an increasingly institutionalized military cooperation. Russian arms
sales and technology have played an important part in the development
of Chinese anti-access/area-denial capabilities. More broadly, Russia and
China appear to be learning from each other’s best practices in hybrid
forms of warfare.21
As a function of this strategic military cooperation, simultaneous
probing by China and Russia of US Allies and interests in East Asia
and Europe could help disperse US resources and thus maximize the
chances of success for Beijing and Moscow. More broadly, Sino-Russian
diplomatic and economic cooperation may also create an effective
wedge against US Alliances. By working together, China and Russia
could reduce the negative repercussions of their actions in the East and
South China Seas or Ukraine, respectively, and also sabotage western
efforts outside East Asia and Europe, as the situation in Syria shows. To
16. See Jacob Cohn et al., Leveling the Playing Field: Reintroducing US Theater-Range Missiles in a
Post-INF World (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2019), https://
csbaonline.org/research/publications/leveling-the-playing-field-reintroducing-us-theater-range
-missiles-in-a-post-INF-world/publication/1; and Luis Simón and Alexander Lanoszka, “The
Post-INF European Missile Balance: Thinking about NATO’s Deterrence Strategy,” Texas National
Security Review 3, no. 3 (Summer 2020): 12–30.
17. Alexander Lanoszka, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Extended Deterrence in Eastern
Europe,” International Affairs 92, no. 1 (January 2016): 175–95.
18. Christopher P. Cavas, “China’s ‘Little Blue Men’ Take Navy’s Place in Disputes,” Defense
News, November 2, 2015, https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2015/11/03/chinas-little-blue
-men-take-navys-place-in-disputes/.
19. Michael M. Bosack, “Ameliorating the Alliance Dilemma in an Age of Gray-Zone Conflict:
Lessons Learned from the US-Japan Alliance,” Naval War College Review 73, no. 4 (2020): 45–66,
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8145&context=nwc-review.
20. Korolev, “Closely Aligned.”
21. Grygiel and Mitchell, Unquiet Frontier.
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the extent the credibility of US military protection is interconnected in
different parts of the world, China and Russia could also work together
to erode Allies’ confidence in US extended deterrence.
Finally, a worsening regional threat environment brings back fears
of abandonment among US Allies in both Europe and East Asia.22 Such
fears are perhaps further compounded both by the aforementioned
America First doctrine and by the fact that the need to deal with greatpower challengers on multiple fronts may force the United States to
prioritize the other region. Indeed, Trump openly questioned the value
of US Alliances and demanded all Allies increase their financial
payments to the United States.23 In the late 2019 negotiations with
South Korea on defense cost-sharing, for example, the United States
reportedly demanded a fivefold increase, although this demand was
subsequently dropped.24
Trump also questioned the US commitment to NATO’s collective
defense and demanded NATO Allies increase defense spending.25 US
pressure on its Allies for economic concessions or increased defense
spending was by no means a new phenomenon, but these recent demands
were more serious because they were combined with a contempt for the
value of US Alliances. Even as the Biden-Harris administration seeks to
rebuild failing Alliances, Allies can no longer take such commitments
for granted.

Differences
Beyond the well-known distinction between the multilateral NATO
and bilateral Alliances in East Asia, there are important differences in
how US Allies relate to regional threats. First, US European Allies are
relatively economically self-reliant. Even though there is some degree of
dependence on Russia, such dependence is confined to the hydrocarbon
sector, which appears to be decreasing and is mutual—Russia is badly
in need of European markets, investments, and technology.26 Thus the
degree of economic interaction and interdependence European Allies
have with the United States far outweighs their dealings with Russia.
In contrast, the economies of America’s East Asian Allies are deeply
intertwined with China, which has become the economic center of
22. Victor D. Cha, “Abandonment, Entrapment, and Neoclassical Realism in Asia: The United
States, Japan, and Korea,” International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 2 (June 2000): 261–91.
23. Zack Beauchamp, “How Trump Is Killing America’s Alliances,” Vox, June 12, 2018,
https://www.vox.com/world/2018/6/12/17448866/trump-south-korea-alliance-trudeau-g7.
24. Bloomberg, “US Drops Demand for Fivefold Hike in South Korea Troop-Funding Bill,
Report Says,” Japan Times, December 26, 2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/12/26
/asia-pacific/us-drops-south-korea-fivefold-demand/#.XhG61FVKiUk.
25. Jeremy Shapiro, “Trump’s Meaningless NATO Spending Debate,” Order from Chaos (blog),
Brookings Institution, July 9, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018
/07/09/trumps-meaningless-nato-spending-debate/.
26. European Commission, “Russia,” European Commission, last updated May 20, 2020,
https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/russia/.
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gravity in the region.27 The interests of the East Asian Allies to preserve
good economic relations with China may at times undermine the
cohesion of America’s Alliances in East Asia.
Another interregional difference lies in the geographic characteristics
of the two theaters. Whereas US Allies in East Asia face China’s
military challenges at sea over maritime territorial disputes, European
Allies confront primarily land-based military threats from Russia.28 In
the military component of its rebalance to Asia, therefore, the Obama
administration emphasized increased investment in the Navy.29
Aside from different military requirements, the geographical
differences are likely to produce different political challenges for the
Alliances. Because maritime borders and territories tend to be far from
metropolitan areas and have few residents, disputants may have a more
difficult time justifying military conflict for their claims or, alternatively,
believe escalation is easier to control than it is on land. For the United
States, for example, it may seem absurd to fight a war against China over
uninhabited islands, even though the US government has repeatedly
confirmed the US-Japan security treaty applies to the Senkaku
Islands.30 For China, in turn, occupying the Senkaku Islands probably
appears to be less provocative and dangerous than invading densely
populated Taiwan.
Finally, unlike NATO’s relatively clear-cut competitive relations
with Russia, some US Alliances in East Asia are ostensibly targeted
against North Korea, which is dangerous and nuclear armed but not
nearly as powerful as China. In fact, the United States and its regional
Allies have seen China as a potential partner to help address the
challenge posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons development. If
North Korea ceases to present a significant threat to Japan and to South
Korea, US Alliances with these two countries will require significant
political adjustments. Meanwhile, NATO is expected to play an
important role in counterterrorism and geopolitics in the Middle East
and North Africa. Although these new missions increase the importance
of NATO, especially to the United States, they can also create friction
among Allies, as was seen at the time of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq.

Perceived Links

Connections between US Alliances in Europe and East Asia
may not be apparent at first glance, but they do exist and can have a
27. Evan A. Feigenbaum and Robert A. Manning, “A Tale of Two Asias: In the Battle for Asia’s
Soul, Which Side Will Win—Security or Economics?,” Foreign Policy, October 31, 2012, https://
foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/31/a-tale-of-two-asias/.
28. Mira Rapp Hooper, “Uncharted Waters: Extended Deterrence and Maritime Disputes,”
Washington Quarterly 38, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 127–46.
29. Robert G. Sutter et al., Balancing Acts: The US Rebalance and Asia-Pacific Stability, Elliott School
of International Affairs and Sigur Center for Asian Studies (Washington, DC: George Washington
University, 2013).
30. Tongfi Kim, US Alliance Obligations in the Disputes in the East and South China Seas: Issues of
Applicability and Interpretations, PRIF Report, no. 141 (Frankfurt, Germany: Peace Research Institute
Frankfurt, 2016): 1–34.

68

Parameters 51(2) Summer 2021

meaningful impact on the strategic calculations of US Allies in each
region—and even on the United States itself. When new developments
create uncertainty about US policy, with potential implications for the
United States’ reputation as an Ally or the allocation of US military
resources, the Allies pay close attention to situations in distant regions.
Moreover, as the United States prepares for global competition
with China, Washington has been paving the road for interregional
cooperation between US Allies. For example, a recent expert group
report to the NATO secretary general argues China is “best understood
as a full-spectrum systemic rival, rather than a purely economic player
or an only Asia-focused security actor,” and asserts “NATO must devote
much more time, political resources and action to the security challenges
posed by China.”31
Two somewhat contradictory interregional connections are
particularly important for US Alliances. First, US Allies in both
regions are affected by the reputation of the United States as a military
protector.32 Insofar as reputation is a global commodity, all US Allies
have reasons to support the reputation of the United States—the
credibility of US extended deterrence helps guarantee their own security.
Yet US military resources, including policymakers’ attention, are limited,
resulting in an inevitable trade-off between what the United States can
commit to in East Asia and in Europe.
Thus, just as the Obama administration’s rebalance to Asia or
the Trump administration’s emphasis on competition with China
provoked uneasiness among European Allies about the sustainability
of Washington’s commitment to Europe, America’s reengagement
with Europe after Russia’s annexation of Crimea led to questions
in Asia about the future of the alleged rebalance. In this regard, the
complementary and competitive relations between the two regions are
an important background to any interregional collaboration among
the Allies.
Beyond these important but abstract connections, what can the
United States and its Allies gain from greater interregional cooperation?
Arguably the most important contributions America’s European and
East Asian Allies can provide to each other’s security are indirect.
In a context defined by resource scarcity and a worsening threat
environment in Europe and East Asia, the United States would prefer its
Allies concentrate their defense resources and efforts in their respective
regions. In this vein, US experts and policymakers often argue the most
efficient way to use the resources and capabilities of America’s European
Allies is to deter Russia and provide security in their own continent—and
31. NATO Reflection Group, NATO 2030: United for a New Era (Brussels: NATO,
November 25, 2020), 27–28, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2020/12
/pdf/201201-Reflection-Group-Final-Report-Uni.pdf.
32. Hal Brands, Eric S. Edelman, and Thomas G. Mahnken, Credibility Matters: Strengthening
American Deterrence in an Age of Geopolitical Turmoil (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, 2018), https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/credibility-matters
-strengthening-american-deterrence-in-an-age-of-geopolit/publication/1.
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its immediate neighborhood—thus relieving Washington of its burden
there as it prioritizes Asia and the Indo-Pacific region.33 The same logic
applies in relation to America’s East Asian Allies, whom the United States
would rather have focus on deterring China in the Western Pacific.34
America’s European Allies would also derive important indirect
benefits if East Asian Allies were to step up their defense and security
efforts, and vice versa. From a European perspective, perhaps the most
useful contribution East Asian Allies can make is to increase their own
military capabilities while also reducing tensions with China. Likewise,
East Asian Allies would very much appreciate a greater European
defense effort, which could free up US resources badly needed in East
Asia.35 East Asian Allies would also welcome a de-escalation between
the West and Russia—perceived to be a relevant stakeholder in Asian
security.36 From their viewpoint, the more conflictual the relationship
between the United States and Russia is, the more of a spoiler attitude
Moscow may adopt in East Asia, for example, by closing ranks with
China on North Korea and other issues.
Even though America’s European and East Asian Allies focus their
efforts on their respective regions, the fact they face similar militarystrategic problems offers opportunities for a structured security
dialogue. Missile defense is one such area. Both sets of allies face the
problem of proliferation of theater-range missiles and the challenges
of addressing this threat through a combination of US support,
the development of indigenous missile defense capabilities, and the
development and deployment of theater-range missiles.37 Another
opportunity relates to countering hybrid warfare and related problems
such as cybersecurity or disinformation.38
Through a more structured dialogue, America’s European and
East Asian Allies could learn best practices from each other in missile
defense or hybrid threat countermeasures—including questions relating
to divisions of labor with the United States—and even cooperate in
research and technology. In this vein, the NATO 2030: United for a
New Era report argues the Alliance should “deepen cooperation with
Indo-Pacific partners, including by strengthening information-sharing
and creating regularised dialogues on technological cooperation and
pooling of R&D in select fields.”39
To be sure, America’s European and East Asian Allies can directly
contribute to each other’s security in a number of ways. Through the
33. Interviews with multiple US defense officials in Washington, DC, and Brussels, Belgium,
September 2018–April 2019; and Barry Pavel and Jeffrey Lightfoot, “The Transatlantic Bargain
after ‘the Pivot’,” Issue Brief, Atlantic Council, March 22, 2012, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org
/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/the-transatlantic-bargain-after-the-pivot/.
34. Interview with US defense official, February 23, 2018.
35. Interviews with multiple Japanese and Australian officials, November 2019–March 2020.
36. Interview with Japanese defense official in Tokyo, January 15, 2020.
37. Jacob Cohn et al., Leveling the Playing Field.
38. Interviews with multiple Japanese, Australian, South Korean, and NATO officials,
September 2018–March 2020.
39. NATO 2030, 15.
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European Union’s arms embargo against China, the steady flow of highquality European weapons systems to East Asia, and engagement in
defense cooperation with key US Allies and partners in the region such
as Japan, Australia, and Vietnam, European Allies are contributing to
the security of East Asian Allies, and the advancement of US strategic
objectives in that region.40
Another important direct contribution to security relates to
diplomatic support in the face of political disputes. Having support
from Allies beyond the scope of any given region adds legitimacy to
US foreign policy, reinforcing its aspiration to frame the US position as
grounded in global rules and norms. In this regard, the support from
Japan and other East Asian Allies in denouncing Russia’s annexation
of Crimea or that of European Allies in denouncing Chinese actions
in the South China Sea represents an important legitimacy boost.41
Arguably, the most practical assistance East Asian Allies can expect
from European Allies is diplomatic and political support. For instance,
European diplomatic support is important for Japan on issues such as
North Korea’s nuclear weapons development and territorial disputes
with China.42 Diplomatic and political support from European Allies
makes it easier for East Asian Allies to frame certain problems (for
example, territorial disputes with China or North Korea’s nuclear
program) as threats to the rules-based international order, rather than
merely a by-product of power politics.
Last but not least, since China is expanding its influence, mostly
through geo-economic tools and the creation of an economic hierarchy
in Asia, it is also important for East Asian Allies to receive European
assistance in countering China’s economic influence attempts. Until
recently, China’s power-projection capabilities were limited, and Beijing’s
leverage over other states derived mostly from its economic clout rather
than its ability to either threaten or protect other states. As the debate
over membership in the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or the
debate over Huawei’s role in 5G networks illustrates, China can resort to
divide-and-rule tactics vis-à-vis US Allies in both regions.

Conclusion

America’s European and East Asian Allies are far away from
each other, but their links with the United States generate important
geopolitical crossovers between regions. These nexuses become
increasingly apparent as the threat by Russia and China to US regional
Allies intensifies simultaneously. Against that backdrop, a number of
relevant questions emerge. How can European and East Asian Allies
strengthen deterrence in their respective regions? And what can they
learn from each other’s experiences in that regard? What are the
40. Luis Simón, “Europe, the Rise of Asia and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship,”
International Affairs 91, no. 5 (September 2015): 969–89.
41. Interviews with multiple Japanese, Australian, South Korean, EU, and NATO officials,
September 2018–March 2020.
42. Interviews with multiple Japanese officials, September 2018–March 2020.
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similarities, differences, and possible connections between US Alliances
in Europe and East Asia? What are the perceptions of credibility of US
extended deterrence that abound in Europe and northeast Asia?
This article has addressed these questions by identifying some of the
similarities, differences, and possible synergies between US Alliances
in Europe and East Asia. While interregional dialogues thus far have
focused on transnational challenges, a focus on deterrence against
great-power challengers is warranted. Certainly as their respective
regional security environments worsen, European and East Asian
Allies are becoming increasingly focused on their immediate vicinities.
This perspective limits the scope for direct engagement beyond each
country’s region. Yet all countries face similar challenges, ranging from
missile proliferation and hybrid forms of warfare from Russia, China, or
(to a lesser extent) North Korea to mounting concerns about America’s
commitment to their security.
Greater coordination can help US Allies learn from each other’s
experiences and best practices in dealing with regional challengers and
better managing their relations with the United States, particularly in
the face of increasing strategic coordination between China and Russia.
Additionally, diplomatic support and greater economic engagement
can be mutually beneficial in terms of strengthening resilience against
regional challengers, mitigating excessive dependence on the United
States, and hedging against the possibility of US retrenchment in the
future. In particular, since China’s geo-economic challenge is global
in scope US Allies worldwide can benefit from supporting each other
against Chinese predatory behavior. Thus, security dialogues between
European and East Asian Allies should involve top leaders who can link
the global, interregional, economic, and security aspects of cooperation.
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